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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY
The requirement that the agency be exclusive in order to
attribute the acts of the agent to the principal has prior support.
In Millner Co. v. Noudar, Lda.,46 the appellate division, first
department, held that where the purported agent is actually an
independent broker representing many different companies on an
independent basis, in no way under the defendant's control,
"the acts of the broker representative . . . are not the acts of the
so-called principal, and do not create a basis for jurisdiction
against... [him] ." 4
The court in the instant case stated that the exclusive agent
doctrine applied only to the factual situation presented therein,
i.e., where the agent sues the principal. If a third party had sued
the defendant, the court indicated, the acts committed on behalf
of the defendant by the agent might have been sufficient to confer
jurisdiction over the defendant's person.4 8
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In Standard Wine and Liquor Co. v. Bombay Spirits Co.,49
the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
appellate division, first department, 50 and held that the defendant
Bombay, which maintained no bank account, telephone 'listing or
warehouse, nor employed any salesmen, nor made any sales within
the State, was not transacting business in New York. Conse-
quently, service of process upon it in England, pursuant to CPLR
313, was not sufficient to give the New York courts in personam
jurisdiction.
The Court rejected the plaintiff's contention that because de-
fendant's goods were ultimately put into commerce in New York,
the defendant was transacting business here.5' Further, neither
the fact that the plaintiff signed the contract in New York, nor
the fact that it was bound to boost Bombay's sales within the
State, were found to be determinative of a transaction of business
in New York. 2
4624 App. Div. 2d 326, 266 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1st Dep't 1966).
4 7 1d. at 328-29, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 291. The Millner case is fully discussed
in The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 41 ST. JOHiN'S L. REv.
279, 293 (1966). Cf. Greenberg v. Lamson Bros. Co., 273 App. Div. 57, 75
N.Y.S.2d 233 (1st Dep't 1947); McKeon v. P. J. McGowan & Sons,
229 App. Div. 568, 242 N.Y.S. 700 (2d Dep't 1930).48 Hertz, Newmark & Warner v. Fischman, 53 Misc. 2d 418, 421, 279
N.Y.S.2d 97, 100 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1967).
4 20 N.Y.2d 13, 228 N.E.2d 367, 281 N.Y.S.2d 299 (1967).
G025 App. Div. 2d 236, 268 N.Y.S.2d 602 (1st Dep't 1966).
51 Standard Wine & Liquor Co. v. Bombay Spirits Co., 20 N.Y.2d 13,
16, 228 N.E.2d 367, 369, 221 N.Y.S.2d 299, 300-01 (1967); see Kramer v.
Vogel, 17 N.Y.2d 27, 215 N.E.2d 159, 267 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1966).
5220 N.Y.2d at 16, 228 N.E.2d at 369, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 301-02, relying on
Singer v. Walker, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965).
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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The present decision follows prior New York case law estab-
lished in Kramer v. Vogl 5s and Millner Co. v. Noudar, Lda."
CPLR 308(1): Redelivery doctrine liberalized
The supreme court, Queens County, in Pitagno v. Staiber,55
held that delivery of the summons to the defendant by his wife,
who found it in a sealed envelope beneath the mail slot in their
home, met the requirements of CPLR 308(1) and constituted valid
service. The fact that no affidavit of service had been made was
deemed to be immaterial, since testimony given by defendant's
wife in open court establishing personal service upon defendant
was of greater force than an affidavit would have been.5 7
It should be noted that in the instant case, and in a prior
case 5s cited by the court to support its argument, there were
compelling circumstances favoring a finding that the service was
valid: had the court held the service of process invalid, the causes
of action would have been barred by the statute of limitations.59
ARTICLE 10- PARTIES GENERALLY
CPLR 1007: Right of impleader extended to insurer prior to
payment of claim.
CPLR 1007 provides that " [after the service of his answer,
a defendant may proceed against a person not a party who is or
may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against
53 17 N.Y.2d 27, 215 N.E.2d 159, 267 N.Y.S.2d 900 (1966). The Court
of Appeals held that the phrase of 302(a) (1), "transacts any business
within the state," did not encompass Austrian defendants who carried on
no sales, promotion or advertising activities within the State, made all
arrangements in Austria and sold their goods, eventually destined for New
York, F.O.B. Austria.
5424 App. Div. 2d 326, 266 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1st Dep't 1966). There the
court held that the acceptance, signing, and mailing of a contract in New
York was not an "act" of the foreign defendant here, nor was it sufficient
to warrant the assumption of jurisdiction over it.
55 53 Misc. 2d 858, 280 N.Y.S.2d 178 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1967).
56 CPLR 308(1) requires that "[p]ersonal service upon a natural person
shall be made: (1) by delivering the summons within the state to the
person to be served. . ....
5753 Misc. 2d at 860, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 180-81.
-5sMarcy v. Woodin, 18 App. Div. 2d 944, 237 N.Y.S.2d 402 (3d Dep't
1963) (memorandum decision).
59 In a recent case, where the action would not have been barred, the
court refused to sustain the validity of the service stating that to dispense
with the requirement of compelling circumstances to allow a departure from
statutory mandate of direct delivery would erase the distinctions between
CPLR 308(1) and CPLR 308(3). See Miller v. Alda Corp., 53 Misc.
2d 279, 278 N.Y.S.2d 574 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1967). See generally The
Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 42 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 283,
288 (1967).
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